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Introduction
This paper analyses the efficiency of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) to manage household packaging wastes. An EPR switches physical and/or financial responsibilities for household waste management from municipalities to producers. So, each producer has to bear the cost of waste resulting from households' consumption of their product.
In the case of household packaging wastes, is common that the producers bear this cost collectively. They create a producer responsibility organisation, which collects producers' contributions and in exchange finances the cost of household packaging waste management.
In order to lower this cost, and so their contributions, producers are induced to modify the design of their packaging by using more recyclable materials and/or reducing their weight. This paper tries to characterise the optimal policy, tariffs that producers should bear to guarantee that they choose the optimal design of packaging. The economic literature has already proposed optimal schemes in several settings.
Under competitive market for product, an optimal policy implies that producers bear the social cost of waste management (Fullerton & Wu, 1998) 1 . This optimal policy can be viewed as a Pigouvian tax. From this, in the rest of the paper, we will refer to the benchmark policy where the producers face an EPR characterised by a pricing according to the social cost of waste management.
Under homogeneous oligopoly and Cournot competition, a Pigouvian tax is too stringent. This is because its introduction lowers quantities put on the market which are already too low 1 In this paper, we focus on product market and we assume that all others markets -recycling and waste management services -are competitive. (Runkel, 2003; Ino, 2007) . An optimal policy supposes that producers bear a waste management cost which decreases according to their markup in product market (Ino, 2007) 2 .
In this paper, the market of packaged product is supposed oligopolistic but also differentiated.
Firms produce a perfect homogenous product, but use packaging to create a subjective differentiation (Tremblay & Polasky, 2002) . This assumption is justified because packaging choice of consumers expresses an environmental consciousness (Bech-Larsen, 1996; Rokka & Uusitalo, 2008) which involves a willingness to pay for environmentally friendly packaging (van Birgelen, Semeijn, & Keicher, 2008; Yue, Hall, Behe, Campbell, Dennis, & Lopez, 2010; Barnes, Chan-Halbrendt, Quanguo, & Abejon, 2011) . So, a vertically differentiated oligopoly seems to be the most relevant benchmark to analyse the efficiency of an ERP for household packaging wastes.
Fleckinger & Glachant (2010) assume a vertically differentiated duopoly and a Bertrand competition. Each producer sells a different quality of a product, and quality determines waste management costs. They show that a Pigouvian tax is an optimal policy when its introduction eliminates differentiation, while it is not an optimal policy in others cases 3 .
Our paper pursues Fleckinger & Glachant's analysis focusing on situations where differentiation remains after the introduction of a Pigouvian tax. Our main contribution is to propose a more realistic representation of the management cost of household packaging wastes, which allows us to determine a new optimal policy.
2 Ino (2007) assume that producers can also have a market power in recycling market. In that case, an optimal policy supposes that the cost of waste management born by producers could be higher or lower than a Pigouvian tax. This cost increases in the markup in the product market, and decreases in the markdown in the recycling market.
3 Fleckinger & Glachant (2010) This original representation of waste management cost allows us to determine a new optimal policy. To the best of our knowledge, only Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) determines an optimal policy in a vertically differentiated duopoly. This policy couples an uniform ad valorem tax to a product tax on the quantity of emissions whose the rate is higher than the cost of environmental damage from emissions 5 . Our optimal policy does not need an ad valorem tax, it is only based on EPR principle. We demonstrate that an optimal policy implies to modulate Pigouvian tax according to waste management cost: when waste management cost is high (respectively low), Pigouvian tax is too lax (respectively stringent) to implement the social optimum.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 characterizes the social optimum. In section 4, we solve for equilibrium prices and qualities.
In section 5, we demonstrate that a Pigouvian tax is not an optimal policy, then we determine the optimal policy. Section 6 concludes about the implications of these optimal policy for household packaging waste management.
The Model
In this paper, we consider a Mussa-Rosen type model of vertical product differentiation which represents a duopoly market. The two firms will be denoted and . Both firms produce a perfect homogenous product. However, they use packaging to create a subjective vertical differentiation. We assume that each firm produces one variant of packaging, denoted , with . Without loss of generality, we assume that .
To focus our attention on packaging only, we assume that the product itself involves no production cost and generates no waste. Consequently, the difference in cost between products is only due to packaging.
We assume that producers can use at most two materials to produce packaging: one material is recyclable, whereas the other is not. As, by assumption, consumers only pay attention to material composition to evaluate packaging quality, we assume that both packaging have the same weight and we normalize it to one. So, one unit of the recyclable material has the same weight than one unit of the non-recyclable material, and represents the quantity of the recyclable material in packaging. We have . We call as the packaging recyclability.
We assume that packaging production involves variable costs 6 which are convex in quality 7 and linear in quantity. The production cost of packaging is represented by the expression where indicates the unit production cost, the packaging recyclability, and the output level 8 .
Let us turn now to our assumptions on waste management cost. Packaging waste management can be divided in three steps: collection, sorting and treatment.
Collection is the transport of waste from households to recyclers. Its cost depends on packaging weight. In our model, by assumption both packaging are equally costly to collect 6 We consider that fixed costs required to develop new packaging are sufficiently low to be neglected. 7 A rise of recyclability can increases production cost for different reasons: recyclable materials such glass are more expansive than non-recyclable material such plastic; for food products, plastic is most cost effective than recyclable materials to produce packaging (Barnes, Chan-Halbrendt, Quanguo, & Abejon, 2011) . 8 The shape of production cost implies that a packaging only made up of the non-recyclable material involves no production cost. The production cost could be represented by without alter conclusions. The production cost of a packaging only made up of the non-recyclable material will be equal to .
since they have the same weight. We consider this cost equals to zero. After collection step, wastes are subjected to sorting and treatment operations.
We define sorting step as the operations necessary to produce homogeneous flows (operations to separate plastic and aluminum mixed in one packaging for example). Therefore, a packaging made up of one material involves no separation cost. In others cases , separation cost is positive. We assume that sorting operations extract minority material in packaging: the recyclable material for , and the nonrecyclable material for . The separation cost is given by with the unit separation cost 9 . This cost can be represented as in figure 1. The figure 1 implies two assumptions on sorting cost. On the one hand, sorting cost increases in the quantity of the minority material: to extract two units of the minority material is more costly than to extract one unit. On the other hand, sorting is unaffected by the nature of the minority material: to extract one unit of the recyclable or non-recyclable material involves an identical cost. As a result, sorting cost is maximal for packaging equally made up of the two 9 We cannot obtain a general solution with a more general form such with and 0 0.5 1 materials. Sorting operations are necessary because each material is differently treated: the recyclable material is recycled, while the non-recyclable material is dumped. Both materials would be dumped without sorting operations. In our model, sorting is perfect: no unit of the recyclable material is dumped.
Regarding to treatment step, we assume that recycling involves no cost 10 and that the social cost of dumping is linearly decreasing in packaging recyclability. The dumping cost is represented by with the unit dumping cost.
The social cost of waste management, denoted , includes sorting and dumping costs and it is represented by :
(1)
The equation (1) implies that a rise of packaging recyclability does not necessary decrease the social cost of waste management . Indeed, we have if . So, when packaging recyclability is low, improve it could increase the waste management cost. The equation (1) can explain why in reality producers are reticent to develop the recyclability of their packaging. This is because it is costly in terms of production but also in terms of waste management.
In our model, a rise of packaging recyclability increases the waste management cost if the packaging is mainly made up of the non-recyclable material , except if the dumping cost is high compared to the sorting cost . In practice, the dumping cost is constant whatever the nature of the non-recyclable material. Contrary to the dumping cost, the sorting cost is very sensitive to the nature of materials.
10 Integrate a positive recycling cost does not alter our conclusions about the optimal policy.
As a result, according to separation cost, a rise of packaging recyclability can increase or decrease the waste management cost. For example, when a mechanic sorting is available such that the sorting cost becomes negligible, a rise of packaging recyclability decreases the waste management cost. But, when the sorting technology involves more complicated treatment (man-made, chemical) a rise of packaging recyclability can involve an increase of the waste management cost.
Before characterising the social optimum, we make two assumptions to insure that all packaging qualities are feasible. On the one hand, we assume that the unit production cost is higher than the unit dumping cost , so . These assumption guarantees that a packaging characterised by is more costly than one characterised by 11 . On the other hand, we assume that the unit production cost is higher than the unit sorting cost , so . This assumption guarantees that the producers have an incentive to mix materials to produce packaging. These two assumptions imply that waste management cost is not too high. Fleckinger & Glachant (2010) make a similar assumption.
The First Best Allocation
The social optimum is the situation that maximises social surplus. The social surplus is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
The surplus of one consumer is given by the following expression:
In this expression (2), is the intrinsic utility derived from the consumption one unit of the product. As Cremer & Thisse (1994) , we make the assumption that large enough for all consumers to buy in equilibrium 12 . Consumers obtain an additional utility which depends on packaging recyclability . This additional utility increases in consumers' environmental consciousness which is uniformly distributed over . Consumers' environmental consciousness can be view as a willingness to pay for packaging recyclability. The global utility is reduced by the price of the good .
As Cremer & Thisse (1994) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), we use a utilitarian social welfare function to express the social surplus. Assuming that the number of quality is given and equal to two and that all consumers buy one unit of the good, the social surplus is given by:
In the expression (3), represents the consumer indifferent between consuming the good from producer or from producer .
From this expression (3), it is easy to obtain the conditions characterizing the socially optimal levels of quality and the social optimal allocation of consumers across qualities: (4) with an optimal quality dispersion . The superscript denotes the optimal value.
12 To guarantee that market is fully covered, others papers (Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005; Bansal, 2008) assume that is distributed over an interval which is not too large. This assumption does not modify our result.
The Market Equilibrium
A Pigouvian tax is applied, so the producers face an EPR characterised by a pricing according to the social cost of waste management. However, two taxes affecting this cost can be implemented: one tax affecting the separation cost, denoted , and one tax affecting the dumping cost, denoted .
From this, the waste management cost born by producers, denoted , is represented by:
As a result, there is settings of taxes where the producers bear a cost equals to the social cost of waste management , and others settings where the producers bear a cost higher or lower than the social cost of waste management .
These taxes are similar to the bonus/penalty system applied by Eco-Emballages. EcoEmballages is a French producer responsibility organisation which collects producers' fees, and transfers it to municipalities which provide household packaging waste management.
Producers' fees have to cover the social cost of waste management. However, fees can be affected by two penalties and one bonus: a penalty on packaging made up of materials difficult to separate; a penalty on packaging made up of non-recyclable materials; and a bonus to producers who improve the recyclability of their packaging. In a schematic way, can be viewed as the penalty on packaging made up of materials difficult to separate, as the penalty on packaging made up of non-recyclable materials and as the bonus to producers who improve the recyclability of their packaging. So, according to the bonus/penalty system, producers can bear a cost higher or lower than the social cost of waste management.
The profit function of a producer is represented by:
In these profit function (6), represents the demand addressed to the producer . Demands functions are:
In these conditions (7 and 8), represents the type of consumer who is indifferent between purchasing the good from producer or from producer . From the expression of consumer surplus (2), we obtain the expression of which is:
The market equilibrium is characterised by a subgame perfect equilibrium. The duopolists' game takes place in two stages. In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously their packaging recyclability. In the second stage, they compete in price. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. Assuming an interior solution, it is routine to obtain:
with an equilibrium quality dispersion . The superscript denotes the market equilibrium. From (9), it is easy to determine the equilibrium value of ,
implying the equilibrium profits:
Producers have identical demands and profits. This fact is due to the quadratic cost function (Bansal, 2008) .
EPR and Optimal Pricing Policy
We start by demonstrating that a Pigouvian tax is not an optimal policy.
 The Pigouvian Tax
We assume that no tax is applied , other than the Pigouvian tax. So, we have . In that case, the allocation of consumers is optimal , but the producers differentiate too much: quality is too low and quality is too high . This confirms the conclusion of Fleckinger & Glachant that Pigouvian tax is not an optimal policy in a vertically differentiated market.
Before to characterise the optimal policy, we analyse separately the impact of taxes on packaging recyclability and quality dispersion 13 . The condition (11) implies that both taxes do not modify the allocation of consumers.
The tax increases the dumping cost born by the producers. A rise of this cost induces both producers to increase the quality of their packaging. However, this does not modify quality dispersion, as:
(13) 13 We analyse impacts of one tax assuming the other is equal to 0.
The tax increases the sorting cost born by the producers. A rise of this cost induces both producers to modify the quality of their packaging according to the difference between the unit production cost and the unit dumping cost . We denote this gap cost , with .
We have : A rise of sorting cost induces both producers to decrease (respectively increases) the quality of their packaging if is high (respectively low), i.e when the unit production cost is high (respectively low) compared to the unit dumping cost. When is high (respectively low) both packaging are majority made up of the non-recyclable material (respectively the recyclable material) and a rise of separation cost, due to its form (figure 1), involves a decrease (an increase) of both packaging qualities. In all cases, a rise of sorting cost increases quality dispersion:
Producers' reaction to a rise of sorting cost always involves a rise of the quality dispersion which increases their profit:
 The Optimal Policy
The optimal policy has to induce producers to choose the right set of quality. The optimal policy is identified by solving the system of equations given by with , as in (10) and as in (4). This yields the following optimal policy:
The tax is negative since . Consequently, the regulator applies a subsidy which lowers the sorting cost born by producers. This subsidy reduces the quality dispersion, and so the producers' profit. The subsidy rate decreases in sorting cost. In others terms, the amount of the subsidy is higher when producers use materials which are costless to separate.
The tax is positive for and negative for , whith . So when the unit cost of dumping is high (respectively low), the regulator applies a tax (respectively a subsidy ) which increases (respectively decreases) the dumping cost born by producers.
As we know that if , the optimal policy increases the probability that a rise of packaging recyclability decreases the waste management cost. So, this optimal policy stimulates producers to increase the recyclability of their packaging, and especially the producer . Now, we determine conditions such that the optimal policy implies that producers bear a cost higher or lower than the social cost of waste management.
Producer bears a cost equal or higher than the social cost of waste management when , while producer bears a cost equal or higher than the social cost of waste management when 14 . These results are summarized in table 1. The cost born by producers depends on separation cost and dumping cost : the cost born by producers has to tend toward the social cost of waste management, even exceeds it, when waste management is costly ( is high). The optimal policy implies that the producer bears a cost higher than the social cost much faster than producer . This result 14 Proofs are presented in appendix.
Producer Producer
may be perceived as counterintuitive: one could think that the producer will be punished first. The optimal policy takes into account that consumers buying from firm are looking for a costless packaging, while consumers buying from firm are likely to pay an extra price for "green" packaging.
It is also interesting to note that even when our optimal policy is different from a Pigouvian tax since a producer bears a separation cost and a dumping cost different from their true value. This is because our optimal policy corrects not only for externalities but also for market power.
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses the efficiency of an EPR to insure optimal choices of packaging. Our model represents a vertically differentiated duopoly. Firms use packaging recyclability to create a vertical subjective differentiation. From this model, we confirm first that an EPR characterised by a Pigouvian tax is not an optimal policy: producers differentiate too much.
Second, we determine an optimal policy which couples a subsidy reducing the sorting cost born by the producers to a tax or a subsidy affecting the dumping cost born by the producers.
Depending to the sorting and dumping costs, this optimal policy implies that the producers bear a cost lower or higher than the social cost of waste management: if sorting and dumping costs are high (respectively low), producers have to bear a cost higher (respectively lower) than the social cost of waste management.
This optimal policy legitimates the application of a bonus/penalty system which affects the cost of waste management born by producers. However, our model seems to indicate that the bonus/penalty system applied by Eco-Emballages and described before is not optimal. In our model, is negative. So, the penalty on packaging made up of materials difficult to separate applied by Eco-Emballages should be replaced by a subsidy whose its rate decreases in difficulty to separate materials.
For futures research, the efficiency of an EPR could be analysed assuming a differentiation on two packaging attributes: recyclability and functionality. As consumers prefer packaging which are more recyclables and functional, a model of two vertical differentiation seems to be relevant to extend research about the efficiency of an EPR.
